People derive value from fulfilling their goals through means that fit their motivational or regulatory orientation. Such "value from fit" is typically found in studies that pair a regulatory orientation with a single means to achieve the goal. But what happens when there are multiple means to achieve the same goal? In this paper we investigate the consequences of such "too much fit" on people's choices among multi-attribute stimuli. We show that too much fit arouses acute decision conflict, and evokes decision processes that result in a pronounced tendency to make counter-normative choices. We test our hypotheses using the attraction, compromise, and deferral paradigms from decision research.
wherein things "feel right" (Higgins, 2000; Labroo & Lee, 2006) . This feeling right is transferred to whatever target object is in question, thus enhancing its value.
Studies of regulatory fit are typically characterized by two important features. The first is that fit is evoked by providing participants with tasks that are congruent with their regulatory goal orientation, and then testing for an effect on a second, target task. Fit creates a positive halo effect that transfers to the subsequently presented target. The second is that the goal orientation is paired with a single set of means to achieve the goal. So, for example, a person in a promotion focus is asked to circle certain words on a sheet of paper (rather than cross them out); this fit between focus and task leads to feeling right.
What happens when there are multiple means to achieve the same goal? Even though regulatory fit research does not address this question directly, one plausible conjecture is that the effect of fit should be just as positive as when one set of means is available, or perhaps even more so. Lewin (1933) and Miller's (1944) classic treatments of goal conflict lend credence to this supposition. They characterize conflict as situations where competing approach and/or avoidance forces act in concert and determine whether a person chooses quickly or vacillates between the options. Avoidance-avoidance conflicts are ones where both options repel an individual. As a result, he vacillates between the two options because as he nears one option, its repellent forces become stronger and he tends towards the other option, leading to slow conflict resolution. In contrast, approach-approach conflicts are resolved quickly because as soon as the individual tends in the direction of one of the options, that option becomes dominant.
Regulatory fit where two goal attainment means fit the regulatory orientation is Too much fit 5 analogous to an approach-approach conflict because both means are attractive. Choices in such circumstances should be quick (Arkoff, 1957) and satisfying (Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1991) ; the "feeling right" that characterizes regulatory fit should be magnified and the options should seem that much more attractive (Higgins, 2006; Higgins et al., 2003) .
But consider the fable of Buridan's ass, the tale of a perfectly rational and quite hungry donkey that is presented with an approach-approach conflict between two equally large, equally tasty bales of hay. Uncertain of which bale to eat-they are both appealing-it dies of starvation. In regulatory fit terms, the donkey dies because it is unable to resolve the conflict between the multiple means that fit its goal. We argue that people face similarly acute decision conflict when experiencing regulatory fit with multiple means (although fortunately they are unlikely to die as a result). The conflict arises because of people's tendency to afford greater weight to an attribute that is compatible with a regulatory goal (Chernev, 2004; Higgins, 2002) . Although this weighting process simplifies choice when a single attribute fits one's regulatory orientation, we suggest that it will actually increase conflict when more than one of the attributes fits. Fit may be good, but sometimes there can be too much of a good fit.
In this paper we examine the consequences of too much fit on people's decisions.
Conflict from too much fit, like any other conflict inherent in making decisions that require trade-offs between attributes, should lead choosers to seek reasons or contextual cues that justify choosing a particular alternative (and hence resolve the dilemma), even if reliance on such reasons will result in counter-normative behavior (Shafir, Simonson, & Too much fit 6 Tversky, 1993) . Therefore, we hypothesize that when multiple attributes and options are compatible with a decision-maker's regulatory focus, she will tend to use decision processes that result in a greater degree of counter-normative choices.
To test the effect of too much fit, we use three paradigms from decision research: compromise, attraction, and deferral. A compromise effect (Simonson, 1989) occurs if an option is preferred more when it is presented as a middle option (such as option b in the set {a, b, c} in Figure 1 ) than when it is presented as an extreme option (such as in the set {b, c, d}). Compromise is an example of the counter-normative context dependence of people's preferences that occurs as a result of a reliance on contextual cues to make a choice; after all, the preference for a combination of attributes should depend on the values of the attributes and not on whether that combination is viewed as more or less extreme relative to other available combinations. An attraction effect refers to the result of adding an alternative to an existing two-alternative choice set {a, c} such that the new alternative {a'} is dominated by one alternative in the set but not the other (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982) . Even though it is dominated-and therefore normatively irrelevant-the new, decoy alternative increases the probability of choice of the alternative that dominates it, leading to a violation of the normative principle of regularity (see Figure 2 ). Like compromise, attraction is also an example of how people's preferences can be biased by contextual cues that facilitate choice because they provide a reason (or justification) that enables an easy resolution of the decision problem. Both the compromise and the attraction effects are more likely to occur when people are uncertain of their subjective valuation of the available choice options. The presence of the contextual cue provides decision-makers with a compelling reason to choose a particular alternative, thus solving the conflict Too much fit 7 inherent in making choices from multiple alternatives (Simonson & Tversky, 1992) . Thus, preferences are often "context-dependent." A third way in which people can resolve decision conflict is by simply deferring their choice (Dhar, 1997; Shafir et al., 1993) . In our experiments we test the effect of (too much) fit on the magnitude of choice deferral as well as the compromise and attraction effects. We hypothesize that context dependence and deferral should be greater in regulatory fit than non-fit conditions.
Overview of Experiments
Compromise, attraction, and deferral experiments typically present respondents with alternatives that are described as identical on all dimensions except for two attributes (for an exception, see Kivetz, Netzer, & Srinivasan, 2004) . Each alternative is thus described by a two attribute combination, and a choice between the alternatives requires the respondent to trade off a high value along one attribute in exchange for a high value along another. In our experiments we evoke regulatory fit by priming participants with a prevention or promotion regulatory orientation and manipulating each attribute's appropriateness as a means to fulfill that orientation. For instance, we describe a laptop along the dimensions of weight and warranty (prevention or "vigilance" attributes) or speed and memory (promotion or "eagerness" attributes).
We present the results from four experiments, using fourteen categories of goods and services. The first two experiments examine the rates of compromise (Experiment 1) and attraction (Experiment 2) when there is a fit compared to a non-fit between the decision-maker's primed regulatory focus and the (two) attributes of the choice alternatives. The data show that the attraction and compromise effects are stronger in the Too much fit 8 fit than the non-fit conditions. In Experiment 3 we test whether the desire to defer choice increases when there is a fit between the primed regulatory state and the attributes of the choice options, and also measure decision conflict explicitly. We find that choice deferral is greater in the fit conditions, and that participants' reported experience of conflict and decision difficulty is indeed greater in the fit rather than the non-fit conditions. Finally, in Experiments 4a and 4b we show that when there is fit with just one of the two attributes that characterize the choice alternative, context dependence and deferral actually decrease relative to a control condition in which participants are not primed with a regulatory goal orientation. This finding also supports the view that attributes that fit the regulatory orientation are afforded greater weight in choice.
Experiment 1
In our first experiment we test the hypothesis that greater fit between a respondent's regulatory goal orientation and the attributes of the alternatives in a choice set will generate a more pronounced tendency to choose the compromise alternative in the set. We tested this hypothesis across eight decision categories. Here and in all subsequent experiments we primed regulatory focus using the Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes' (1994) procedure that asks participants to list two examples either of their hopes and ideals or of their oughts and obligations. These constructs map onto promotion and prevention, respectively (Higgins et al., 1994) . To prevent dissipation of the priming effect, the priming task was repeated at the midpoint of the questionnaire, ostensibly as a second part to the initial priming task. The attributes that were used here and in the next experiments to describe the options in each category were classified by us as promotion attributes or prevention Too much fit 9 attributes based on the definitions of eagerness/promotion and vigilance/prevention strategies as described in Higgins et al. (2003) . In order to confirm that the attributes were classified correctly, we conducted a post-experimental manipulation check wherein for each attribute participants were asked to rate the extent to which that attribute "help[s] you achieve a desired outcome" and the extent to which that attribute "help[s] you avoid a negative consequence." We expected that the attributes we had classified as promotion means would rate higher on the achieve question than the avoid question, and vice versa for attributes that we had classified as prevention means.
Method.
Two hundred undergraduate and graduate student respondents received $7 for their participation in the study. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions, in a 2 (regulatory focus prime: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (attribute type: eagerness vs. vigilance) x 3 (three trinary-choice sets) between-participant design.
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Following the priming task they were asked to imagine that they were in the market for each of the following categories (presented in succession): apartments, laptops, fitness centers, digital camcorders, hotels, frequent flier programs, credit cards, and cell phone plans. For each category participants were offered three options, described by two attributes, with one of the options representing a compromise relative to the two others in the set. In order to properly counterbalance the cells, the design was such that participants were asked to make six fit (non-fit) choices and two non-fit (fit) choices. Participants were told that the options differed only in terms of the two attributes mentioned, and were equal in every other sense. Midway through the experiment they were asked to write two more ideals or oughts in order to reinforce the priming manipulation. Since compromise is detected by calculating the relative choice share of an alternative when it is a compromise versus when it is not, the same option appeared in more than one choice set (but in a different condition, of course, see footnote 2; Table 1 presents the stimuli levels).
Results.
To analyze the data we compared the choices of participants in the fit conditions with the choices of participants in the non-fit conditions for promotion and prevention focus, separately. In other words, participants in a promotion (prevention) prime condition who had been asked to choose among options described by promotion (prevention) attributes were compared with prevention (promotion) prime condition participants who had been asked to choose among the same options. We computed the magnitude of the compromise effect for the fit and non-fit conditions, and then calculated the difference between these two magnitudes by subtracting the non-fit magnitude from the fit magnitude.
A positive difference indicated greater compromise in the fit condition than in the non-fit condition. Note that our design enabled us to test this twice for each decision category (for a total of 32 tests) because we could test the compromise effect using the share of option b relative to option c as well as using the share of option c relative to option d (see footnote 2). Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. We find support for the hypothesized pattern of "too much fit": across our decision categories, greater fit led to a greater likelihood to make context-dependent (compromise) choices in 21 of the 32 possible cases (z = 7.46, p < .0001; see Rosenthal, 1978) . For example, the magnitude of the compromise effect was greater for the camcorder category when prevention primed participants were Too much fit 11 presented with cameras described along the vigilance attributes weight and battery life (11.1%) than when promotion primed participants were presented with the same attributes (-31.4%). When participants were promotion primed, the compromise effect was greater when the camcorders were described along the eagerness dimensions of picture quality and optical zoom (50.0%) than when prevention primed participants were presented with the same attributes (13.3%).
It is noteworthy that the categories that did not fully display the predicted data pattern (hotel package, fitness club, and apartment) included attributes that our manipulation check indicates were misclassified as eagerness or vigilance. In the fitness category, for instance, the attribute "number of workout classes" was intended as an eagerness attribute but was considered by participants to be a vigilance attribute (its mean "achieve" rating was 3.1 and mean "avoid" rating was 3.3). It is also noteworthy that the magnitude of the 21 hypothesis-supporting comparisons was much greater than the magnitude of 11 hypothesis-disconfirming comparisons (see column 5 in Table 2 ); the mean absolute difference is greater for positive differences (44%; median = 43%) than for negative differences (16%; median = 11%).
Experiment 2
In experiment 2 we test our conceptualization using the attraction effect paradigm.
Here, too, we expected greater context-dependent choice in conditions where the respondent's primed regulatory goal orientation fits the regulatory mode of the attributes used to describe the choice options. In other words, we expected that the magnitude of the increase in choice probability of a target option when presented alongside an Too much fit 12 asymmetrically dominated decoy option (relative to when there is no decoy) will be greater in the fit conditions than in the non-fit conditions.
Method.
One hundred and eighty seven participants were recruited on campus and received $7 for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (promotion vs. prevention prime) x 2 (attribute type: eagerness vs. vigilance) x 2 (binary vs. trinary choice set) between-participants design. To measure attraction we calculate the difference between the choice share of a target option when it is in a binary choice set and the same option's relative share in a trinary choice set that includes an alternative that the target option asymmetrically dominates (a "decoy" option). Once again we manipulated regulatory fit by priming a regulatory goal orientation and either matching it with products whose attributes fit or do not fit the primed orientation. We used eight decision categories: vacation packages, humidifiers, laptops, graduate programs, credit cards, suitcases, cars, and vacuum cleaners. Participants were asked to imagine that the options presented to them differed only in terms of the two attributes mentioned, and were equal in all other respects. As in experiment 1, in order to properly counterbalance the cells, the design was such that participants were asked to make six fit (non-fit) choices and two non-fit (fit) choices. Table 3 shows the stimuli used in this study.
Results.
Once again, we analyzed the data by comparing the choices of participants in the fit and non-fit conditions for the promotion and prevention prime conditions, separately. For each condition, we assessed the magnitude of the attraction effect by calculating the difference in a target option's choice share when it appeared in a binary choice set versus its Too much fit 13 relative share when it was presented alongside an asymmetrically-dominated decoy alternative in a trinary choice set. Next we computed the difference between the magnitude of the attraction effect in the fit and non-fit conditions (for each regulatory prime condition); a positive difference signified that the attraction effect had been greater in the fit conditions than the non-fit conditions. As each of the eight decision categories yielded two differences (one for each of the regulatory primes), we computed 16 differences. The results supported the prediction that fit between the primed regulatory focus and the attribute's regulatory orientation would lead to a stronger attraction effect. Attraction was greater in 13 of the 16 comparisons between fit and non-fit (p < .03, by sign test; see Table 4 for results).
As an example, consider the Prague vacation package category, in which the attraction effect equaled 16.7% when prevention primed participants were presented with vacation packages described along the (vigilance) dimensions of number of flight stopovers and the type of travel insurance included in the package. In this category, the attraction effect was much weaker (3.6%) when promotion primed participants were presented with the same vigilance attributes. Likewise, when participants were promotion primed, attraction was greater (22.1%) when the vacation packages were described along the (eagerness) dimensions of complimentary services and hotel star rating than when prevention primed participants were presented with the same attributes (-4.9%). It is noteworthy that the three comparisons that were in the opposite direction than we had predicted (suitcase for both prevention and promotion primes and vacuum for prevention prime) were also the only categories where our manipulation check data show that the attributes we used did not conform to their a priori classification as eagerness or vigilance attributes. For example, we had assumed that aesthetic appeal would rate higher on the Too much fit 14 "achieve" (eagerness) scale than the "avoid" scale. Its actual ratings were in the opposite direction, suggesting that aesthetic appeal was not considered to be an eagerness attribute as we had anticipated.
Experiments 1 and 2: Within-participant Analysis
In addition to testing our hypothesis at the category level, we conducted a test at the individual participant level. Our hypothesis implies that an individual experiencing too much regulatory fit will be more likely to make context-dependent choices than an individual experiencing no fit. As a consequence of our counterbalancing scheme wherein each participant actually made six choices in the fit (non-fit) condition and two choices in the non-fit (fit) condition, we cannot meaningfully compare an individual's own proclivity to make a context-dependent choice in fit versus non-fit. Instead, we restrict our analysis to the six fit or non-fit choices that we asked the respondent to make.
We computed the number of context-dependent choices in the fit and non-fit conditions for each respondent in both experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., we lumped compromise and asymmetrically-dominating choices into one analysis). As predicted, we find that the mean number of context-dependent choices in the fit conditions was significantly greater (4.0) than in the non-fit conditions (2.0; t 187 = 5.82, p < .0001). This result lends support to our hypothesized too much fit effect: in conditions where participants experienced too much fit, they exhibited double the tendency to make context-dependent choices.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 present evidence consistent with a too much fit effect: fit leads to a tendency to make counter-normative choices when more than one means is available to fulfill a regulatory goal orientation. Based on previous research that links contextToo much fit 15 dependence with choice conflict, we have conjectured that this tendency is a result of the heightened dilemma experienced by our respondents in the fit conditions relative to the non-fit conditions. In experiment 3 we test this conjecture more directly using a choice deferral paradigm. Participants are presented with two alternatives to choose from and then are asked to indicate the extent to which they prefer to defer their choice to another time.
Deferral should be greatest among those respondents who are experiencing conflict deciding between the options (Dhar, 1997; Shafir & Tversky, 1992) . Participants were also asked to rate the difficulty of the choice; like the deferral ratings, these difficulty ratings were expected to be higher in the fit conditions than in the non-fit conditions.
Method.
Ninety-seven participants were recruited on campus and received $7 in return for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (promotion vs. prevention prime) x 2 (attribute type: eagerness vs. vigilance) betweenparticipant design. We presented respondents with eight decision categories: laptops, vacation packages, humidifiers, apartments, vacuum cleaners, cars, credit cards, and restaurants. For each category we asked participants: 1) to make a choice; 2) to rate their preference to delay the choice and instead continue to search for more information about the options; and, 3) to rate the difficulty of the choice in the event that they were forced to choose among the two options. All ratings were done on seven point scales. As in the previous studies, participants repeated the priming task midway through the choice task.
Results.
We analyzed the data by comparing the ratings of delay and difficulty in the fit and non-fit conditions for promotion and prevention-primed participants, separately.
Since we tested eight categories, there were 16 possible comparisons for both delay and difficulty. The results supported the too much fit prediction: participants in the fit conditions showed a preference to delay and reported greater choice difficulty than participants in the non-fit conditions (see Table 5 ). Mean deferral ratings were greater in the fit conditions than in the non-fit conditions for 15 of the 16 possible comparisons and mean difficulty ratings were greater in the fit conditions for all 16 comparisons (p < .0005
for both by sign test). For example, for the car category the means for "prefer to delay" were significantly higher when promotion-primed participants were presented with cars described by the eagerness dimensions of power and seat comfort (4.9) than when prevention-primed participants were presented with the same cars and attributes (3.4).
Similarly, the delay ratings of prevention-primed participants presented with cars described along the vigilance dimensions of fuel economy and warranty (5.3) were greater than promotion-primed participants presented with the same cars and attributes (2.4). The results support the conjecture that when more than one means is available to sustain a regulatory goal orientation, decision conflict increases; this conflict, we have argued, enhances the tendency to rely on contextual decision cues.
Experiment 4a
In Experiments 1 and 2 we established that fit between a respondent's regulatory state and the attributes of a stimulus lead to greater context-dependence in choice. In Experiment 3 we reported evidence indicating that this context dependence is a result of the conflict that arises when two attributes are equally useful means to achieve a regulatory goal. We assume that this conflict occurs because goal congruent attributes are afforded greater psychological weight, and this greater weight begets heightened Too much fit 17 conflict. In the current study we buttress the weighting account by comparing situations where only one of the two attributes that describes an option fits the respondent's regulatory focus. For instance, ceteris paribus, an automobile with (relatively) low speed performance and high fuel economy will be more appealing to a person in prevention focus than an automobile with high speed performance and low fuel economy.
Conversely, ceteris paribus, the promotion focused individual will prefer the latter automobile to the former. We expect that the option that is stronger along the dimension that fits the participant's regulatory orientation will be more likely to be selected. That is, decision-makers are expected to choose according to the attribute that they weigh more heavily rather than based on the choice context because the attribute that fits provides a ready solution to the choice problem. This tendency should be relatively pronounced such that compared with an unprimed control condition, context-dependence in the fit condition should be lower. We used compromise as the paradigm to test this hypothesis.
Method.
One hundred and eighty participants were recruited and paid $7 for their participation. We randomly assigned respondents to one of nine conditions in a 3 (primed states: promotion, prevention, and control) x 3 (three trinary sets) betweenparticipants design. Participants were primed with oughts (prevention), ideals (promotion), or given an irrelevant thought-listing task involving their favorite genre of reading and its change over time (control condition). We used three categories of goods: apartment, fitness club membership, and laptop computer. As before, participants were informed that the goods that they were being presented with differed only along the dimensions described, but were equal in all other respects. Each decision category Too much fit 18 included items characterized by two attributes, with only one attribute designed to fit the respondents' regulatory orientation. Participants were asked to make choices; following the choice phase they rated the importance of the eight attributes using a 1 to 10 scale.
We expected that attributes that fit the regulatory state would be rated as more important.
See Table 6 for a summary of the stimuli.
Results.
The results support our predictions. We calculated the magnitude of the compromise effect using the choice share of option b relative to option c as well as using the share of c relative to d (see Figure 1 and footnote 1), for each prime condition separately. This enabled four potential comparisons per decision category (12 in total).
Specifically, we compared the magnitude of the compromise effects in the control condition when comparing the share of b relative to c and c relative to d, with the magnitude of the corresponding compromise effects in each of the two prime conditions. Consistent with our hypothesis, the compromise effect was greater in the control condition than in either of the prime conditions in 12 out of the 12 possible comparisons (p < .0005, sign test). Table 7 presents the choice probabilities for each decision category. For example, in the apartment category, the compromise effect for option b in the control condition was 17%, but only 3% in both the promotion and prevention prime conditions. In other words, unlike in the previous three experiments where (too much) fit led to an increase in context-dependence, here fit prompted respondents to select the option that was stronger on the dimension that fit their regulatory orientation. Fit actually reduced-rather than heightened-conflict because it provided a ready "solution" for the choice problem that participants were facing. The choice proportions in the prevention and promotion Too much fit 19 conditions underscore this point: respondents tended to favor the options that were strong along the primed dimension. This tendency was significant for the apartments and laptop categories (χ 2 = 5.71 and 9.86, respectively, p < .02) and in the right direction but not significant for the fitness club category.
The importance ratings support our assertion that attributes that fit the decisionmaker's regulatory focus are afforded greater weight in the choice task (see also Chernev, 2004; Higgins, 2002) . For all six attributes in the three categories tested we found that the attribute that fit the participants' primed regulatory state was rated as more important than the attribute that did not fit. This indicates that our choice results were driven by attribute importance. There was no discernible pattern to the importance ratings in the control condition.
Experiment 4b
In Experiment 4a we demonstrate that fit with a single means compatible with a primed regulatory orientation leads to a decrease in context-dependence relative to an unprimed control. We have argued that this is because fit with a single means makes the choice easier because it provides a ready solution to the decision problem. It therefore follows that fit with a single means should also lead to less choice deferral than a control condition. In this study we test this hypothesis using the deferral paradigm that we used in Experiment 3. As in Experiment 4a, we created three conditions: a no prime control, a prevention prime, and a promotion prime and presented participants with options described by one eagerness attribute and one vigilance attribute. We expected that the tendency to delay would be greater in the control condition than the prime conditions, Too much fit 20
and that participants would report the decisions in the control condition to be more difficult.
Method.
Ninety participants were recruited on campus and paid $7 for their participation.
They were randomly assigned either to the control, promotion prime, or prevention prime condition. As before, promotion and prevention were primed by asking participants to list their ideals and oughts, respectively. The control participants completed an irrelevant thought-listing task. We used four decision categories: digital cameras, apartments, laptops, and home stereos. Each decision category included items characterized by two attributes, with only one attribute designed to fit the respondents' regulatory orientation.
Participants were asked to rate their preference to delay the choice and instead seek more information. Next they were asked to rate the difficulty of the decision. We expected that delay and difficulty ratings would be greater in the control condition because in the prime conditions participants could simply choose the option that was strong along the dimension that fit their primed regulatory orientation.
Results.
The data supported our predictions (see Table 8 for results). We compared the preference to delay and the difficulty ratings in the control condition to the preference to delay and difficulty ratings in the promotion and prevention prime conditions for each of Taken together with the results of Experiment 3, these findings support our hypothesis that too much fit leads to deferral because respondents have to grapple with the conflict that comes from too many means fulfilling their regulatory goal.
General Discussion
Regulatory fit is a meta-cognitive state of "feeling right" that occurs when there is congruence between regulatory goal orientation and a means to achieve the goal.
Numerous studies have presented evidence pointing to the positive consequences of fit, including enhancement of value, greater enjoyment from a task, and greater persuasion (for a review, see Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Higgins, 2005) . In this paper we examine the consequences of fit with more than one means to achieve a goal. We show that in such situations of "too much fit," decision-makers experience conflict with regard to which means to favor, and as a result resort to choice heuristics that lead them to make counternormative choices and increase their tendency to defer their decisions.
We used the attraction, compromise, and deferral paradigms from decision research to study the effect of too much fit. In Experiment 1 we show that fit between a primed regulatory orientation and the attributes that characterize the choice options induces a pronounced tendency to choose a compromise alternative relative to a condition in which the primed orientation and the attributes do not fit. In Experiment 2 we show that a similar too much fit effect leads respondents to shift their choices toward an option that asymmetrically dominates a third, normatively irrelevant option. This shift violates the normative principle of regularity, by which the choice share of an option should not increase when a new option is added to the choice set. Experiment 3 documents the effect of too much fit on the tendency to defer decisions. Participants in the fit conditions were more likely to defer their choice, and also rate the decision as more difficult than participants in non-fit conditions.
Experiments 4a and 4b highlight the role of attribute weighting in the too much fit effect.
We compare situations of fit with a single attribute to a control condition where no regulatory goal is primed, and find that the tendency to make counter-normative choices in the fit conditions decreases relative to the control condition. This finding suggests that the source of conflict in the too much fit effect is that both "fitting" attributes are afforded relatively heavy weight in the decision process. As a result, the decision becomes especially difficult because no option seems to dominate, and participants use contextual cues such as compromise or asymmetric dominance as tiebreak mechanisms (Experiments 1 and 2) or defer their choice (Experiment 3).
Why does too much fit turn our respondents into Buridan's asses rather than happy, quick decision-makers as predicted by Lewin and Miller in particular, and by the fit literature in general? One possible explanation relates to the trade-offs that our participants make in the fit conditions. While it is true that both attributes fit (which "feels right"), favoring one attribute implies trading off the potential benefit from the other (which "feels wrong"). That is, there is a built-in negative correlation between the attributes, so that any improvement on one attribute requires a sacrifice along another.
We conjecture that this potential trade-off is experienced as a loss; as participants "approach" an attribute, the loss in the other attribute becomes more acute. The loss is amplified by the fact that fit increases engagement, which heightens the attractiveness of Too much fit 23 the options (both the chosen and the foregone) even more (Higgins, 2006; Higgins et al., 2003) . The reliance on the contextual cue-the compromise alternative or the asymmetrically dominated decoy alternative-functions as a tie-breaking mechanism that skirts the need to make any trade-offs between the two attractive options. Likewise, in the deferral study delaying the choice enables respondents to avoid experiencing conflict.
Note that in Lewin and Miller's approach-approach conflicts the options do not have negatively correlated attributes. Rather, the options are "non-comparables," each consisting of its own unique (uncorrelated) set of attributes (Slovic & MacPhillamy, 1974) .
One could argue that since participants had to make trade-offs in the non-fit conditions as well, they should be just as likely to exhibit context-dependent choices as their fit condition counterparts. Even though this may have been the case for some of our participants, the negativity of the trade-off was particularly severe for our fit condition respondents because they were being asked to resolve a conflict among attributes that were particularly attractive to them given their regulatory goal state. The increased engagement (Higgins 2006) and motivation (Higgins 2000) evoked by regulatory fit intensified this conflict, making compromise, attraction and deferral options tempting solutions for the choice problem. In contrast, the non-fit condition respondents were deciding between attributes that, despite being desirable, were ones that they cared much less about. As a result, the loss they experienced by favoring one attribute was less acute, and they were much less likely to rely on contextual cues to make a decision.
Paradoxically, Buridan's ass may have survived had the two bales of hay been less tasty.
Too much fit 24
The intensified conflict experienced by participants in our fit conditions should amplify their natural tendency to rely on the contextual cues that are congruent with their regulatory focus. More specifically, Mourali, Bockenholt, and Laroche (2007) show that promotion focused decision-makers, because of their desire to achieve hits and ensure advancement, are more likely to use the dominance heuristic available in an attraction context. In contrast, the authors find that prevention-focused participants, because of their desire to avoid mistakes and maintain a safe course of action, are more likely to be drawn to compromise options that allow them to avoid risky extremes. The decision conflict experienced by participants in the Mourali et al. studies-the result of which was
context-dependent choice-should be magnified in our too much fit conditions. Thus, their findings imply that in our own data we should observe a greater difference between the magnitude of the attraction effect in the fit versus non-fit conditions for promotionprimed participants than the corresponding difference for prevention-primed participants.
This was the case for 7 of the 8 decision categories we tested. In contrast, we should observe the opposite in our compromise data: the difference in the propensity to make the compromise choice between the fit and non-fit conditions should be greater for prevention-primed participants than promotion-primed participants. We observe this in 11 of the 16 possible comparisons. The deferral data should show a similar pattern to compromise, as deferral is a vigilant strategy that enables the decision-maker to avoid a loss, and is congruent with a prevention focus. Indeed, we find that desire to delay choice was greater for prevention-primed participants than promotion-primed participants in 6 of the 9 categories tested, and difficulty was greater for prevention-primed participants in 7 of the 9 categories tested.
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Conclusion.
Life often avails people with various means to fulfill their regulatory goals. When a single means dominates others, its fit with the regulatory orientation leads to a metacognitive positive state of "feeling right," resulting in a transfer of positive value onto a subsequent object or task. This valuation process is complicated in cases where multiple means are equally effective at fulfilling a goal. Even though Lewin (1933) and Miller's (1944) classic treatment of conflict suggests otherwise, we find that too much fit induces decision conflict, which in turn can lead to a dependence on contextual cues to make a choice and result in counter-normative decision-making. So fit can sometimes "feel wrong," and, indeed, too much of it turns us into Buridan's asses. Although counternormative choice may be preferable to death by indecision, it is an outcome that most laypeople prefer to avoid.
Too much fit 26 Too much fit 28 The first column lists the decision category; for each category we tested the compromise effect using the choice share of b relative to c in sets {a, b, c} and {b, c, d} (i.e., P(b, c|a) -P(b, c|d) as well as the choice share of c relative to d in sets {b, c, d} and {c, d, e} (i.e., P(c, d|b) -P(c, d|e). The second column lists the primed regulatory orientation, and the third and fourth columns list the magnitude of the compromise effect when the attributes of the option set fit and did not fit, respectively, the primed orientation. The fifth column is the difference between the magnitude of the compromise effect in the fit and non-fit conditions; according to our too much fit hypothesis, this difference should be positive. Where this difference is positive, the sixth column indicates a "Y," otherwise a "N." The first column lists the decision category and the primed regulatory orientation. The second and third columns list the magnitude of the attraction effect when the attributes of the option set fit and did not fit, respectively, the primed orientation. The fourth column is the difference between the magnitude of the attraction effect in the fit and non-fit conditions; according to our too much fit hypothesis, this difference should be positive. Where this difference is positive, the fifth column indicates a "Y," otherwise a "N." The first column lists the decision category and the primed regulatory orientation. The second and third columns list the average delay rating when the attributes of the option set fit and did not fit, respectively, the primed orientation. The fourth column indicates whether the delay rating is greater in the fit rather than non-fit condition; according to our hypothesis, this should true ("Y"). The fifth and sixth columns list the average difficulty rating when the attributes of the option set fit and did not fit, respectively, the primed orientation. The seventh column indicates whether this was true, as we had hypothesized. The first column lists the decision category; for each category we tested the compromise effect using the choice share of b relative to c in sets {a, b, c} and {b, c, e} as well as the choice share of c relative to d in sets {b, c, d} and {c, d, e}. Columns two, three and four report the magnitude of the compromise effect for the prevention, promotion, and control prime conditions, respectively. Columns five and six indicated whether the compromise effect was greater for the regulatory prime conditions relative to the control; according to our hypothesis, this should be the case (denoted by a "Y"). The first column lists the decision category and whether the values in the next columns are the delay or the difficulty ratings. Columns two, three and four report the mean delay and difficulty ratings in the prevention, promotion, and control prime conditions, respectively. Columns five and six indicated whether delay and difficulty were greater for the regulatory prime conditions relative to the control; according to our hypothesis, this should be the case (denoted by a "Y").
